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EXPANDING PARTICIPATION IN CONSTITUTION MAKING:
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
ANGELA M. BANKS*
INTRODUCTION
Internal exclusion is a substantial impediment to the successful
implementation of participatory democratic reforms in post-conflict
states. The recent use of participatory constitution making in states
like Rwanda illustrates the challenge that inclusion presents.'
* Assistant Professor, College of William & Mary School of Law.
1. Participatory constitution making entails the use of democratic processes in the
drafting and adoption of a state's constitution. It is seen as a mechanism that can create
democratic governance systems that robustly protect civil and political rights. Kirsti Samuels,
Post-Conflict Peace-Building and Constitution-Making, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 663, 668-69 (2006).
Participatory constitution making is based on the idea that legitimate government action
must include those who will be affected by the action in the decision-making process. Vivien
Hart, Constitution-making and the Transformation of Conflict, 26 PEACE & CHANGE 153, 169
(2001) [hereinafter Hart, Constitution-making]; VIVIEN HART, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, SPECIAL
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Inclusion ensures not only that individuals are physically present
in the decision-making forums, but that they have an "effective
opportunity to influence the thinking of others."2 This requires that
participants review and reconsider their preexisting preferences and
positions in light of reasons and justifications offered by other
participants. 3 Absent a willingness or ability to do so, the decision-
making process becomes one in which original positions are
zealously defended and decisions are made based solely upon factors
such as numerical majorities and political power.4 Participants
argue, rather than deliberate, which reduces their ability to
influence the thinking of other participants. This creates a situation
in which those in the numerical minority or without significant
political power are internally excluded.
Internal exclusion was a prominent feature of Rwanda's partici-
patory constitution-making system. The system used a small, mini-
mally representative drafting body, the Legal and Constitutional
Commission, that rarely deliberated substantive issues with the
REPORT: DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION MAKING 3-4 (July 2003), available at http://www.usip.
orgtpubs/specialreports/srl07.pdf [hereinafter HART, DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION MAKING].
Furthermore, decisions should be made through a process of deliberation in which action is
justified with reasons. This method of decision making requires a minimum level of po-
litical equality and inclusion to operate successfully. IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND
DEMOCRACY 23 (2002).
2. YOUNG, supra note 1, at 55; see also Angela M. Banks, Challenging Political
Boundaries in Post-conflict States, 29 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 105 (2007) (discussing contribution and
engagement as components of internal exclusion). Internal exclusion is one of the means by
which individuals have participation without power. Young explains this by noting that,
[h]aving obtained a presence in the public, citizens sometimes find that those
still more powerful in the process exercise, often unconsciously, a new form of
exclusion: others ignore or dismiss or patronize their statements and
expressions. Though formally included in a forum or process, people may find
that their claims are not taken seriously and may believe that they are not
treated with equal respect. The dominant mood may find their ideas or modes
of expression silly or simple, and not worthy of consideration.
YOUNG, supra note 1, at 55.
3. See JOHN DRYZEK, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND BEYOND: LIBERALS, CRITICS,
CONTESTATIONS 1 (2000); AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY? 20 (2004); YOUNG, supra note 1, at 22-23.
4. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 3, at 16 ("By taking existing or minimally
corrected preferences as given, as the base line for collective decisions, the aggregative
conception fundamentally accepts and may even reinforce existing distributions of power in
society.").
1044
2008] CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 1045
public.5 The drafters focused on educating the public about the role
of a constitution within a society and identifying widely held
beliefs about general governance issues, such as whether the state
should have a presidential or parliamentary style of government.6
Substantive engagement7 was limited to internal Legal and
Constitutional Commission (LCC) meetings and LCC exchanges
with government officials.8 Absent a representative within the LCC
or the support of influential government officials, citizens lacked an
opportunity to have the constitution drafters seriously engage their
concerns, ideas, recommendations, or proposals.' This lack of
internal inclusion created a situation in which most citizens were
denied the opportunity to participate in the substantive decision-
making process.10 Rwanda focused on facilitating external inclusion
through public meetings, questionnaires, and radio and television
broadcasts." This created a system with significant participation
without power, which undermines the theoretical and legal
5. The Legal and Constitutional Commission (LCC) had twelve commissioners who were
elected by the Transitional National Assembly. Legal and Constitutional Commission-
Rwanda, About Our Commission, http://www.cjcr.gov.rw/eng/about.htm (last visited Feb. 16,
2008). Eight members represented the eight officially registered political parties, one
represented the army and national police, two represented civil society, and one represented
the private sector. NAT'L UNITY AND RECONCILIATION COMM'N, REPUBLIC OF RWANDA,
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL SUMISIT ON UNITY AND RECONCILIATION 52 (2002), available at
http://www.grandslacs.net/doc/2998.pdf [hereinafter UNITY AND RECONCILIATION REPORT].
Concerns have been raised about the political perspectives represented within the LCC and
amongst the participants in the public forums. PRISCILLA YACHAT ANKUT, INT'L INST. FOR
DEMOCRACY & ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE, THE ROLE OF CONSTITUTION-BUILDING PROCESSES IN
DEMOCRATIZATION: CASE STUDY RWANDA 21 (2005), available at http://www.idea.intconflict/
cbp/upload/CBP-Rwanda.pdf ("Only members of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and
sympathizers of the RPF-led government participated in forums and debates convened by
the Constitutional Commission."); COMM'N To STUDY AND EVALUATE THE PROPOSED
CONSTITUTION (CSEC), AMAHORO PEOPLE'S CONG., THE CSEC' REPORT (Nov. 2002),
http://www. newrwanda.org/csec-report.htm (finding that "the Rutaremara commission [the
LCC] was entirely composed of supporters of the Kagame regime and devoid of any
representation from the growing opposition").
6. See UNITY AND RECONCILIATION REPORT, supra note 5, at 17-21.
7. Engagement refers to participants taking the claims of other participants seriously
and treating each other with equal respect. See YOUNG, supra note 1, at 55.
8. See id. at 20-21.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See LEGAL & CONSTITUTIONAL COMM'N, REPUBLIC OF RWANDA, TOWARDS A
CONSTITUTION FOR RWANDA: ACTION PLAN 2002-2003, at 20-21 (Apr. 2002), available at
http://www.cjcr.gov.rw/eng/actionplancjc.PDF.
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justifications of participatory constitution making. Further research
into the ways in which citizens are internally excluded is critical for
evaluating states' use of participatory constitution making and
assisting states in implementing it effectively.
Part I locates the theoretical and legal foundations of participa-
tory constitution making within participatory democratic theory and
the right to self-determination. This discussion identifies inclusion
as a fundamental requirement for successful participatory constitu-
tion making. Part II examines the tension between inclusion and
political power in post-conflict states, and Part III identifies the
barriers to internal inclusion that existed in Rwanda.
I. CONSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
Scholars and policy makers concerned about democratization
efforts in post-conflict states are beginning to focus on the process
by which reforms are made, not just the substance of the reforms.
This has led to an emphasis on citizen participation in the drafting
and implementation of constitutions. This form of constitution
making is referred to as democratic or participatory constitution
making. Advocates advance both normative and instrumental
benefits for process-oriented constitution making. The normative
justifications are rooted in participatory democratic theory, empha-
sizing the importance of broad participation and deliberation for the
creation of a legitimate governance system.
A. Normative Foundation
Participation in government decision making is emerging as an
international norm. Participatory democratic 2 scholars connect the
12. Throughout this Article I will use the more inclusive term "participatory democracy"
to refer to a set of democratic theories that prioritize public involvement in government
decision making. These theories include deliberative democracy, communicative democracy,
and discursive democracy. Although they differ from each other in the types of communication
that deliberation should include and the spaces in which deliberation ought to take place, they
all conceptualize democracy generally as
a framework of social and institutional conditions that facilitates free discussion
among equal citizens-by providing favorable conditions for participation,
association, and expression-and ties the authorization to exercise public power
(and the exercise itself) to such discussion-by establishing a framework
1046 [Vol. 49:1043
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legitimacy of government action to the participation of those
affected by the decision in the decision-making process.' 3 The
decision-making process is thus conceived of as a "well-conducted
conversation," and the goal is to give all affected individuals a
ensuring the responsiveness and accountability of political power to it through
regular competitive elections, conditions of publicity, legislative oversight, and
so on.
Joshua Cohen, Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy, in DEMOCRACY AND
DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL 95, 99 (Seyla Benhabib ed.,
1996).
Deliberative democracy traditionally focuses on argument and reason as the sole type of
communication within the public sphere. Iris Marion Young's communicative democracy is
premised on the idea that additional forms of communication must be permitted to ensure the
external and internal inclusion of all members of the polity. YOUNG, supra note 1, at 40.
John Dryzek contends that deliberative democracy has taken a liberal constitutionalist turn
that he seeks to move away from. The liberal constitutionalist turn sees liberal democracy as
the "uniquely proper home for deliberation." DRYZEK, supra note 3, at 3. He finds this focus
unnecessarily constraining because it "ties deliberation to a needlessly thin conception of
democracy, growing ever thinner in light of the constraints that the capitalist market economy
imposes upon effective state democracy." Id. Dryzek's discursive democracy is more critical
in its "orientation to established power structures, including those that operate beneath the
constitutional surface of the liberal state, and so insurgent in relation to established
institutions." Id. at 2. It is
pluralistic in embracing the necessity to communicate across difference without
erasing difference, reflexive in its questioning orientation to established
traditions (including the tradition of deliberative democracy itself), trans-
national in its capacity to extend across state boundaries into settings where
there is no constitutional framework, ecological in terms of openness to
communication with non-human nature, and dynamic in its openness to ever-
changing constraints upon and opportunities for democratization.
Id. at 3. These variations will be noted and addressed throughout the Article, but the focus
is on participatory democracy as a category of theoretical conceptions of democracy that view
democracy as
a model for organizing the collective and public exercise of power in the major
institutions of a society on the basis of the principle that decisions affecting the
well-being of a collectivity can be viewed as the outcome of a procedure of free
and reasoned deliberation among individuals considered as moral and political
equals.
Seyla Benhabib, Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy, in DEMOCRACY AND
DIFFERENCE, supra, at 67, 68.
13. See YOUNG, supra note 1, at 5-6 ("The normative legitimacy of a democratic decision
depends on the degree to which those affected by it have been included in the decision-making
process and have had the opportunity to influence the outcomes."); Lani Guinier, More
Democracy, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 16 ("Democracy is about participating. Participation
matters. It matters because the decisions that governments make affect everyone. Respect for
those decisions, including those with which we disagree, demands meaningful participation
in the decision making process.").
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genuine voice in the conversation. 14 Thus the "decisive test of a
democracy is its capacity to encourage its population to play an
active role in its government."' 5 This principle has influenced the
development of international legal rules regarding citizen partici-
pation in governance matters.
The constitution-making conversation is a discussion of prob-
lems, conflicts, interests, preferences, and claims of need.1" Within
participatory democracy, participants offer solutions for the
problems raised or proposals to address the needs mentioned. They
present reasons and justifications to persuade other participants to
accept their solutions or proposals. 7 Through dialogue the partici-
pants test and challenge the proposals and arguments of the other
participants. Deliberation is to continue until the "force of the
better argument" compels the participants to accept a particular
conclusion. 9 Proposals are rejected or refined based on their ability
to withstand "dialogic examination."2 ° Thus decisions are made
based on which proposals are supported by the best reasons, as
decided by the participants, rather than which proposals are
supported by the largest number of people.2' The idea that interests
are dynamic and that the process of deliberating facilitates interest
transformation is a key premise of participatory democracy.22
Politically equal actors deliberating political matters in an environ-
14. Guinier, supra note 13, at 21. Proponents of participatory constitution making refer
to this form of constitution making as a conversation that takes place between and among
elites and the general public. HART, DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION MAKING, supra note 1, at 11.
15. Geraint Parry & George Moyser, More Participation, More Democracy?, in DEFINING
AND MEASURING DEMOCRACY 3, 46 (David Beetham ed., 1994).
16. See HART, DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION MAKING, supra note 1, at 3, 5, 7; YOUNG, supra
note 1, at 22; Hart, Constitution-making, supra note 1, at 169-70 (drawing a connection
between deliberative democracy and participatory constitution making).
17. YOUNG, supra note 1, at 22.
18. Id.
19. Iris Marion Young, Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy,
in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE, supra note 12, at 120, 121 [hereinafter Young,
Communication].
20. YOUNG, supra note 1, at 23.
21. Id.
22. See DRYZEK, supra note 3, at 1; GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 3, at 20; YOUNG,
supra note 1, at 26.
1048 [Vol. 49:1043
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
ment free from coercion or domination can often develop a consen-
sus.
23
Inclusion and political equality are two foundational norms of
deliberative democracy.24 To increase the likelihood that the "best
arguments" will emerge and be discussed, it is essential that a wide
variety of interests, opinions, and perspectives are raised. The
inclusion norm supports this goal. Furthermore, because decisions
are made based on reasons and dialogic examination, those that
participate are more likely to transform their positions than those
who do not participate. Inclusion assists in interest transformation
taking place on a much larger scale.
Political equality ensures that all affected individuals are
included in the decision-making process on equal terms.25 This
includes having an opportunity to express one's interests and
concerns and to question one another, respond to criticisms
raised, and critique the arguments and proposals of others.26 This
requires that the participants have equal respect for each other.27
Additionally, participants must be equal "in the sense that none of
them is in a position to coerce or threaten others into accepting
certain proposals or outcomes., 2' The political equality norm
ensures that all participants are free to speak and have the same
23. YOUNG, supra note 1, at 5-6, 23; Seyla Benhabib, Models of Public Space: Hannah
Arendt, the Liberal Tradition, and Jiirgen Habermas, in HABERMAS AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE
73, 87-88 (Craig Calhoun ed., 1992) (noting that deliberation among political equals is the
basis of democratic legitimacy because it enables "those affected by general social norms and
collective political decisions [to] have a say in their formulation, stipulation, and adoption").
Deliberation will not always lead to consensus. As noted by Gutmann and Thompson, "[o]n
many disagreements, especially reasonable ones, people will not change their minds, no
matter how respectfully they deliberate with their opponents." GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra
note 3, at 20. Deliberation does however, encourage participants "to consider their opponents'
positions on the merits, rather than to try to explain them as products of unfavorable
conditions, such as impaired judgment, misguided motives, or cultural influences." Id.
24. These two norms are similarly foundational for participatory constitution making.
HART, DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION MAKING, supra note 1, at 11 ("Genuine public participation
requires social inclusion, personal security, and freedom of speech and assembly.").
25. YOUNG, supra note 1, at 23.
26. Id.
27. Young, Communication, supra note 19, at 126.
28. YOUNG, supra note 1, at 23.
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opportunity to speak.29 Political rights guaranteeing freedom of
expression, conscience, and assembly support this norm.3 °
Participatory decision making also provides a space in which
innovative solutions and approaches to problems can emerge that
are qualitatively better than the solutions and approaches devel-
oped in elite or exclusive settings. Effective solutions to concrete
problems often require "the variety of experience and knowledge
offered more by diverse, relatively more open-minded citizens and
field operatives."'" Designing an effective political system in a post-
conflict state requires a similar cast of participants. Such societies
are confronted with developing institutions, rules, and procedures
to resolve political, economic, or social disputes that can effectively
impede future armed conflict. Elite discussions or deliberations
generally focus on addressing the security, political, and economic
concerns of the elite. Such a narrow focus during constitution
making can cause drafters to miss out on effective substantive
governance solutions. Participation by those with the complaints,
those experiencing the difficulties, and those tempted to take part
in armed rebellions can lead to the emergence of different types of
recommendations, proposals, and solutions. Participatory constitu-
tion making recognizes the public as a resource for democratiza-
tion.33 This approach to constitution making seeks to utilize the
experiences, knowledge, and ideas of the public. It is based on a
normative claim regarding the value of public participation and a
legal claim based on the right to self-determination.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Archon Fung & Erik Olin Wright, Deepening Democracy: Innovations in Empowered
Participatory Governance, 29 POL. & SOC. 5, 18 (2001) (noting the effective solutions to school
governance and policing in Chicago that emerged as a result of bottom-up neighborhood
councils that would not have been developed if officials had acted autonomously); see also
David Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699, 1764 (2005).
32. T.M. Franck, Postmodern Tribalism and the Right to Secession, in PEOPLES AND
MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3, 21 (Catherine Brolmann, Ren6 Lefeber & Marjoleine
Zieck eds., 1993).
33. See supra notes 5-11 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Rwandan
constitution-making process.
1050 [Vol. 49:1043
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B. Legal Foundation
The right to self-determination and the right to participate in the
conduct of public affairs provide a legal foundation for citizen
inclusion in the constitution-making process. Constitution making
is not only an aspect of public affairs, it is also a means by which
citizens can participate in determining the State's political status
and its economic, social, and cultural development.34 There has been
a considerable amount of scholarship on the evolution of the right
to self-determination. Of specific interest to constitution making is
what the right entails substantively.35 This question has led to a
conceptualization of the right as both external and internal. The
external conceptualization refers to the "right for the peoples of the
State to determine how the State will be run without external
interference." 6 The internal right is an entitlement to participate in
the State's decision-making processes regarding its political status
and its economic, social, and cultural development.3 7
The right to political participation not only refers to a citizen's
right to participate in decision making regarding his or her State's
political status, constitution, or government, but also to a right to
participate in the conduct of political affairs. This participation right
is based on Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR).38 Article 25 states that:
34. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 25: The Right To Participate
in Public Affairs, Voting Rights and the Right of Equal Access to Public Service (Art. 25), U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7 (Dec. 7,1996) (adopted at the fifty-seventh session July 12,1996)
[hereinafter General Comment No. 25]; Franck, supra note 32, at 20-21; Allan Rosas, Internal
Self-determination, in MODERN LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION 225, 229-30 (Christian
Tomuschat ed., 1993) (defining the internal right to self-determination as the "right of a
people to determine its constitution" and the "right of a people to govern, that is, to have a
democratic system of government").
35. See, e.g., James Crawford, The Right of Self-Determination in International Law: Its
Development and Future, in PEOPLES' RIGHTS 7, 7-9 (Philip Alston ed., 2001); Franck, supra
note 32, at 20-21; Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM.
J. INT'L L. 46, 57-58 (1992); Inge V. Porter, Two Case Studies in Self-Determination: The Rock
and the Bailiwick, 4 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 339, 358-59 (2003); Jerome Wilson, Ethnic Groups
and the Right to Self-Determination, 11 CONN. J. INT'L L. 433, 457 (1996).
36. Geoff Gilbert, Autonomy and Minority Groups: A Right in International Law?, 35
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 307, 325 (2002); see also Rosas, supra note 34, at 227.
37. See Franck, supra note 32, at 20-21; Rosas, supra note 34.
38. General Comment No. 25, supra note 34, at 2.
The rights under article 25 are related to, but distinct from, the right of peoples
2008] 1051
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Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without
any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without
unreasonable restrictions:
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly
or through freely chosen representatives;
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections
which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and
shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free
expression of the will of the electors;
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public
service in his country.39
The United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC or
Human Rights Committee) has concluded that the right to
participate in the conduct of public affairs extends to constitu-
tion making.4" In Marshall v. Canada, the UNHRC addressed a
Canadian tribal society's claim of exclusion from the State's
constitution-making process.41 The Mikmaq tribal society in Canada
submitted a communication to the UNHRC under the Optional
Protocol to the ICCPR claiming that its rights to self-determination
and to take part in the conduct of public affairs had been violated.42
The Mikmaq tribal society contended that Canada's refusal to allow
it to attend the constitutional conferences convened pursuant to the
Constitution Act violated their above-mentioned rights.43 The
Constitution Act "envisaged a process which would include a
constitutional conference to be convened by the Prime Minister of
to self-determination. By virtue of the rights covered by article 1 (1), peoples
have the right to freely determine their political status and to enjoy the right to
choose the form of their constitution or government. Article 25 deals with the
right of individuals to participate in those processes which constitute the
conduct of public affairs. Those rights, as individual rights, can give rise to
claims under the first Optional Protocol.
Id.
39. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 25, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 [hereinafter ICCPR].
40. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Marshall v. Canada, 5.3, U.N. Doc. CCPRC/43/D/
205/1986 (Dec. 3, 1991), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/html/dec205.
htm.
41. Id. 3.1.
42. Id. 3.2.
43. Id.
1052 [Vol. 49:1043
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Canada and attended by the first ministers of the provinces and
invited 'representatives of the aboriginal peoples of Canada."'"
Several conferences were convened by the Prime Minister, and he
invited representatives of several national associations to represent
aboriginal groups.4" The associations were the Assembly of First
Nations,4" the M6tis National Council,4" and the Inuit Committee on
National Issues.4 s
The Mikmaq tribal society's claim amounted to one of internal
exclusion. The Mikmaq maintained that their interests were not
properly represented at the constitutional conferences because they
could not get one of the invited associations to adequately represent
them and they had not given the Assembly of First Nations (AFN)
any right to represent them.4' The Mikmaq tribal society attempted
to influence the AFN by submitting a package of constitutional
proposals to it and protested "in the strongest terms any discussion
of Mikmaq treaties at the constitutional conferences in the absence
of direct Mikmaq representation."5 ° The AFN, however, did not
submit any of the Mikmaq position papers to the constitutional
conferences, nor did the AFN incorporate them into its positions.5 "
Addressing the alleged violation of article 25(a), 2 the Human
Rights Committee concluded that constitutional conferences
constitute a conduct of public affairs, but that the Mikmaq tribal
society's rights had not been violated. 3 The composition, nature,
and scope of activities of constitutional conferences in Canada
caused the UNHRC to conclude that such conferences "do indeed
constitute a conduct of public affairs. 54 In determining the scope of
citizens' right to participate in such activities, the UNHRC held that
44. Id. 2.2.
45. Id.
46. This association was invited to represent primarily non-status aboriginal groups. Id.
47. This association was invited to represent the M6tis. Id.
48. This association was invited to represent the Inuit. Id.
49. Id. 4.2.
50. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
51. Id.
52. The Human Rights Committee had earlier determined that claims for alleged
violations of article 1 cannot be brought under the Optional Protocol. Id. 5.1 (citing U.N.
Human Rights Comm., Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/38/D/167/1984
(1990)).
53. Marshall, T$ 5.3, 6.
54. Id. 9 5.3.
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it is for the "legal and constitutional system of the State party to
provide for the modalities of such participation."5 Article 25(a)
protects citizens' rights to participate in the conduct of public affairs
directly or indirectly, and the UNHRC rejected the idea that this
right allows citizens to decide whether they will take part in the
conduct of public affairs directly or through freely chosen represen-
tatives.56 Canada's decision to design a constitutional review process
that utilized conferences attended by the first ministers of the
provinces provided for citizen participation through freely chosen
representatives.57 Article 25(a) does not create an unconditional
right to direct participation in the conduct of public affairs; rather,
it allows states to choose direct or representative modalities.5" As
long as the state's chosen modality of participation does not
discriminate on the basis of "race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or
other status" or unreasonably restrict participation, it will not
contravene article 25(a).59
The Human Rights Committee reiterated these conclusions in
1996 in the General Comment on Article 25, stating that citizens
participate directly in the conduct of public affairs "when they
choose or change their constitution or decide public issues through
a referendum or other electoral process conducted in accordance
with paragraph (b)."6° In this comment the UNHRC refrained from
specifying what participation should look like, but it discussed a
variety of modalities. These included popular assemblies, consulta-
tive bodies, freely chosen representatives, referenda, elections, and
public debate and dialogue.61
The UNHRC focused its analysis on external inclusion, whether
citizens are present in the decision-making forums directly or
indirectly through representatives.62 The Human Rights Committee
did not address internal inclusion and whether the internal right to
55. Id. 95.4.
56. Id.
57. Id. 92.2.
58. Id. 5.5.
59. ICCPR, supra note 39, at art. 25.
60. General Comment No. 25, supra note 34, 6.
61. Id. 6-9.
62. Id. T 6.
1054 [Vol. 49:1043
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self-determination includes the right to have an "effective opportu-
nity to influence the thinking" of the decision makers.63 The focus on
external inclusion has been adopted by post-conflict states utilizing
participatory constitution making. This form of inclusion adheres to
international norms and rules regarding citizen participation in the
conduct of public affairs, which reinforces a State's legitimacy
within international society.64 The lack of emphasis on internal
inclusion, however, minimizes the normative and instrumental
benefits of participatory constitution making.65
II. POWER AND POLITICS
Participatory constitution making is fundamentally about
enacting social and political change in post-conflict states.6 6 Its
supporters within the international community view it as a tool for
implementing democracy where it has ceased to exist and for
entrenching social and political rights where they have only
nominally existed.67 In all societies, but particularly post-conflict
states, there is a significant disparity in the political and social
power of elites and ordinary citizens.68 A consequence of this power
differential is that most segments of society are virtually precluded
"from any meaningful role in the exercise of political power. '69
Advocates of participatory constitution making acknowledge this
63. YOUNG, supra note 1, at 55.
64. See infra note 107.
65. See supra notes 5-11 and accompanying text (discussing Rwanda's constitutional
process as an example).
66. See, e.g., Samuels, supra note 1, at 667.
67. Cf. id.
68. DOUGLAS MCADAM, POLITICAL PROCESS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF BLACK INSURGENCY
1930-1970, at 21 (2d ed. 1999). The power elite concept was first used by C. Wright Mills to
describe those within society "whose positions enable them to transcend the ordinary
environments of ordinary men and women; they are in positions to make decisions having
major consequences." C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE POWER ELITE 3-4 (1956). National power resides
within the economic, political, and military domains of society and its leaders represent the
power elite. Id. at 6.
69. McADAM, supra note 68, at 21 ("Elite theorists depict society as characterized by a
marked disparity in power between some societal elite, however defined, and the mass of
ordinary citizens. The effect of this disparity is virtually to preclude most segments of
society--especially the lower class-from any meaningful role in the exercise of political
power.").
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reality and argue that greater participation in the constitution-
making process will provide new and important opportunities for
more individuals and groups within the society to participate in
political decision making.7 ° Yet calls for increased citizen participa-
tion do not adequately address the problem of participation without
power.7'
A state's political system includes members and challengers.
Members are those "groups possessing sufficient politico-economic
resources to insure that their interests are routinely taken into
account in decision-making processes. 72 Challengers are those
"groups whose interests are routinely 'organized out' of institution-
alized political deliberations because of their lack of bargaining
leverage. '"" The ability of members to facilitate political change
within a society will be vastly different than the ability of challeng-
ers to do the same.74 Member-driven change projects will generally
seek limited reforms and utilize institutional strategies that build
upon existing relationships with key decision makers.75 Challengers,
on the other hand, tend to seek changes that transform the status
quo in ways that are incompatible with member interests. Due to
their controversial goals and limited access to elite decision makers,
challengers utilize a combination of institutional and non-institu-
tional strategies.
77
Increasing the participation of all members of society, including
challengers, is a core goal of participatory constitution making. Yet
power does not follow automatically from participation. Groups
70. See sources cited supra notes 1-2.
71. Robert R. Alford & Roger Friedland, Political Participation and Public Policy, 1 ANN.
REV. SOC. 429, 431 (1975).
72. MCADAM, supra note 68, at 24; see also WILLIAM A. GAMSON, THE STRATEGY OF SOCIAL
PROTEST 9-12 (2d ed. 1990); CHARLES TILLY, FROM MOBILIZATION TO REVOLUTION 52 (1978).
73. MCADAM, supra note 68, at 24; see also GAMSON, supra note 72, at 14-16.
74. The types of change sought, access to elite decision makers, and the strategies utilized
will also vary significantly for these groups. McADAm, supra note 68, at 24.
75. Id. Institutional strategies target political and legal decision makers and utilize
methods such as lobbying and pursuing legal challenges.
76. Edwin Amenta & Michael P. Young, Democratic States and Social Movements:
Theoretical Arguments and Hypotheses, 46 SOC. PROB. 153, 154-55 (1999).
77. Non-institutional strategies include activities like demonstrations, marches, and
community education. SIDNEY TARROW, POWER IN MOVEMENT: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND
CONTENTIOUS POLITICS 3 (1998); Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the
Law: The Case of Affirmative Action, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436, 1504-05 (2005).
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within a society have "access to different types of power that affect
the level and consequences of their members' participation. 7 Based
on research examining political participation opportunities for poor
Americans in the 1970s, Alford and Friedland concluded that
"institutionalized political participation does not have the power to
reshape political priorities."79 While power and participation are
"causally related phenomena," they are independent."0 Power can
exist without participation and participation can occur without
power.8 " Alford and Friedland found that elites encouraged poor
Americans to participate in the political system in the spaces in
which policy making did not occur, which limited the effect of such
participation to "spasmodic challenges." 2 A similar phenomenon can
be seen in the use of participatory constitution making in post-
conflict states. The drafting process is structured to facilitate
discussions and deliberation amongst members-the victors or the
parties to the peace agreements-and simultaneously insulate
drafters from substantively engaging with challengers.
Traditionally, peace negotiations take place amongst the individu-
als and entities that possess the power to effectuate a cessation of
hostilities. These negotiations often lead to a constitution or political
power-sharing agreement. The political aspects of the peace agree-
ment will ensure that the negotiating parties will not be perma-
nently excluded or exposed to political abuse in the future. 3
Political power-sharing agreements contain self-enforcing guaran-
tees, as there is no third party monitoring compliance or enforcing
the agreement. Such agreements tend not to distribute political
power in competitive or ambiguous ways. 4 They articulate specific
78. Alford & Friedland, supra note 71, at 472.
79. Id. at 464.
80. Id. at 431.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 464. The authors found that the "impact of actual substantive participation was
slight and, more important, was blocked whenever it attempted institutional change." Id. at
460.
83. BARBARA F. WALTER, COMMITTING TO PEACE: THE SUCCESSFUL SETTLEMENT OF CIVIL
WARS 27 (2002).
84. Id. at 30. Elections, one of the benchmarks of democratic transition, will generally be
resisted by the combatants for the early years of the post-conflict state. Elections only provide
combatants with the opportunity to compete for political power; they do not guarantee a role
in the post-conflict state's government. Democratic institutions are not likely to be successful
overnight, and combatants know that these institutions will be unable to prevent a rapid grab
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power-sharing quotas, divisions of key ministries and executive
positions."s This enables the parties to guarantee themselves key
leadership positions, to insulate themselves from future harm, and
to prevent rivals from consolidating power.86
In limiting general access to political power, the parties
negotiating the peace agreement address their fears of political
exclusion, but they often exacerbate those fears within the general
population." Those outside of the negotiating parties' network have
little to no chance of having any significant political power within
the post-conflict state. Such exclusion can limit the legitimacy of the
post-conflict state in the eyes of the state's inhabitants88 and
perpetuate feelings of exclusion and marginalization amongst
portions of the state's population, which could fuel future armed
attacks.8 9 Participatory constitution making is one mechanism that
has been advanced to address this exclusion. Within a political
environment in which negotiating parties greatly fear political
exclusion, participatory constitution making may only provide
challengers with limited opportunities for political inclusion.
The 2002 North-South peace negotiations in Sudan and the
current conflict in Darfur are examples of exclusive peace negotia-
tions exacerbating fears of political exclusion. Sudan has been in the
midst of an armed internal conflict since 1983.9° A common explana-
tion for the war is that southern rebels are attempting to exercise
their right to self-determination after decades of being politically
and economically marginalized by the north.91 This conception of the
for power. Thus a new government could ignore agreements to open up the political system
and work instead to serve only its narrow interests. Additionally, civil society will not be
strong enough to support the nascent democratic institutions or effectively control their
misconduct. Id. at 29-30.
85. Id. at 30.
86. Id.
87. See, e.g., HART, DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION MAKING, supra note 1, at 3 ('CTraditional
constitution making as a conclusion of conflict and codification of a settlement that intends
permanence and stability can seem to threaten rather than reassure.").
88. See, e.g., id.
89. See Ren6 Lemarchand, Exclusion, Marginalization and Political Mobilization: The
Road to Hell in the Great Lakes, in FACING ETHNIC CONFLICTS 61, 67 (Andreas Wimmer et al.
eds., 2004).
90. See Millions Dead in Sudan Civil War, BBC NEWS, Dec. 11, 1998, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/africa/232803.stm (last visited Feb. 16, 2008).
91. See, e.g., TED DAGNE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., SUDAN: HUMANITARIAN CRISIS, PEACE
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conflict led the international community to support the 2002 peace
talks between the Government of Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan
People's Liberation Movement/Sudan People's Liberation Army
(SPLM/A).92 The GOS represented the northern interests and the
SPLM/A represented southern interests.
The 2002 Naivasha Protocol addressing power sharing in post-
war Sudan grants the National Congress Party (NCP)93 and the
SPLM 80 percent of the seats in the National Assembly and the
National Executive during the six-year interim period before
elections will be held.94 In the newly-created Southern Sudan
Assembly, the SPLM will hold 70 percent of the seats while the NCP
will have 15 percent, leaving only 15 percent of the seats for "other
Southern political forces."9 This system grants political control to
two parties, which together do not represent the interests of all of
the major segments of Sudanese society. While the world welcomed
this development in the Sudanese peace process, several prominent
Sudanese political leaders critiqued the new constitution as a
bilateral pact that excluded significant portions of the Sudanese
population.96
In 2003, a new chapter in the Sudanese civil war began when the
Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality
Movement (JEM) attacked military installations in Darfur-a
TALKS, TERRORISM, AND U.S. POLICY (May 8, 2002), available at http://fpc.state.gov/
documents/organization/10861.pdf.
92. Id.
93. The National Congress Party (NCP) is, and at all relevant times has been, the political
party in power in Sudan. Therefore the GOS and the NCP are the same entity for negotiating
purposes.
94. The NCP and the SPLM will also hold 80 percent of the seats in the state legislatures,
with the NCP filling 70 percent and the SPLM occupying 10 percent of the seats in Northern
states and vice versa in Southern states. Protocol Between the Government of Sudan (GOS)
and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) on Power Sharing art. 4.4.2, May 26,
2004, http://www.usip.org/library/pa/suda/power-sharing_05262004.pdf [hereinafter Power
Sharing Agreement].
95. Id. art. 3.5.1. The same division is made for the executive branch of the Government
of Southern Sudan.
96. See, e.g., Tanalee Smith, Sudanese Former PM Criticizes Constitution, Says New Govt
Is Not Inclusive, SUDAN TRIB., July 11, 2005, available at http://www.sudantribune.com/
spip.php?articlelO583; Sudanese Opposition Parties Want Peace Protocols To Become
National, SUDAN TRIB., May 28, 2004, available at http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?
article3157.
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northern region of Sudan. 7 Despite being designated the represen-
tative of northern interests in the 2002 peace talks, the GOS failed
to include the concerns of African Darfurians on the agenda." As a
result "many concluded that, if they ever wanted to see their needs
met, they would have to do what John Garang had done in the
South: take up arms against the Sudanese government and try to
get the world's attention."99 On April 25, 2003, the SLA and the
JEM did just that,10 ° and the humanitarian crisis in Darfur is now
covered daily in newspapers around the world. In 2002 armed
conflict had not reached Darfur, but there were significant problems
regarding political representation and the distribution of economic
resources. The exclusion of African Darfurians from the 2002 peace
talks and the content of the power-sharing arrangements developed
during those talks may have exacerbated tensions in Darfur and
possibly contributed to the outbreak of violence in the spring of
2003.101
The Sudan experience exemplifies the tension that exists between
political elites' need for guaranteed political power and widespread
citizen participation in designing the states' governance system.
Scholars have advanced two main theories articulating the factors
under which parties to an armed conflict will enter into peace
negotiations and the circumstances under which those negotiations
will be successful. One theory focuses on the ripeness of the
conditions on the ground and the other contends that civil wars end
when the underlying conflicts are adequately resolved.10 2 These
97. Intl Crisis Group, Conflict History: Sudan, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm
(search "conflict history: sudan"; then follow first result hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 16, 2008).
The rebel groups claim that the attacks were a response to the long-term economic and
political marginalization of the region and an attempt to protect their communities from
attacks by government-supported "Janjaweed" militias. Id.
98. Samantha Power, Dying in Darfur, NEW YORKER, Aug. 30, 2004, at 60 (noting that
Darfurian leaders were "excluded from the U.S.-backed peace talks").
99. Id. at 62.
100. Id. at 61.
101. See id. at 60-62.
102. See, e.g., FRED CHARLES IKLA, EVERY WAR MUST END 13-16 (1971) (underlying
conflict); GLENN SNYDER & PAULDIESING, CoNFLIcTAMONG NATIONS 12-13 (1977) (underlying
conflict); STEPHEN JOHN STEDMAN, PEACEMAKING IN CIVIL WAR: INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION
IN ZIMBABWE, 1974-1980, at 25-28 (1991) (ripeness); I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN, RIPE FOR
RESOLUTION: CONFLICT AND INTERVENTION IN AFRICA 267-73 (1989) (ripeness); James D.
Fearon, Rationalist Explanations for War, 49 INTL ORG. 379 (1995) (underlying conflict);
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theories provide insight as to when combatants will begin to
negotiate and what substantive issues the negotiations will need to
address in order for the parties to sign an agreement. Barbara
Walter helps us further understand what is necessary for the
parties to adhere to the agreements they sign. She argues that it is
the credibility of enforcement of the peace agreement that reduces
the parties' uncertainty and increases the likelihood that they will
comply with the peace agreement. 103 Security commitments enforced
by third parties reduce the level of uncertainty the parties will face
during the highly dangerous implementation period."0 4 Similarly,
political power-sharing arrangements enable the parties to self-
enforce the political agreements, which reduces uncertainty.'
Widespread citizen participation in the constitution-making process
increases uncertainty.0 6 One way political elites in post-conflict
states address this tension is by creating participatory constitution-
making systems that facilitate participation without power. 07
Robert Randle, The Domestic Origins of Peace, 392 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. Sci. 76, 77-
80 (1970) (underlying conflict). Ripeness theories maintain that particular economic, military,
or political conditions on the ground encourage combatants to negotiate and settlements
follow from that point. See ZARTMAN, supra. Scholars in the second group acknowledge the
importance of the conditions on the ground but claim that the negotiations will not be
successful unless the issues driving the war are resolved in a mutually agreeable manner.
WALTER, supra note 83, at 7-8.
103. Id. at 26-31.
104. Id. at 26-27.
105. Id. at 27-31.
106. Walter argues that combatants who fear permanent exclusion from political power will
not give up their military options if the peace agreement distributes power in a competitive,
and thus ambiguous, way. Id. at 30.
107. See, e.g., HASSEN EBRAHIM, KAYODE FAYEMI & STEPHANIE LOOMIS, PROMOTING A
CULTURE OF CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY IN COMMONWEALTH AFRICA 8-14 (1999),
available at http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/publications/constlconstitutionalism_
booklet_1999.pdf. The willingness of post-conflict states to utilize participatory constitutions
is tied to their desire to have legitimacy internationally and domestically. Id. at 11.
International norms regarding appropriate governance systems and methods for
implementing those systems support the use of participatory constitution making. See, e.g.,
HART, DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION MAKING, supra note 1, at 4-7; Otive Igbuzor, Constitution
Making in Nigeria: Lessons for Making a People's Constitution, Paper Presented at the
Conference on Constitutional Development, Kibuye, Rwanda (Aug. 19-24, 2001), available at
http://www.cdd.org.uk/cfcr/constitutionlessons.htm (author is the Secretary for the Citizen's
Forum for Constitutional Reform, an organization founded out of a Centre for Democracy and
Development project). Rwanda's LCC received substantial international support from entities
such as the United Kingdom Department for International Development, United Nations
Development Fund for Women, the government of Sweden, and USAID. UNITY AND
2008] 1061
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
III. INTERNAL EXCLUSION
One of the most significant barriers to the effective use of
participatory constitution making in post-conflict states is exclusion.
Exclusion can be external or internal."' 8 External exclusion refers
to the ways in which individuals are precluded from participating
in the forums in which substantive decision making occurs." 9
Internal exclusion occurs when individuals are physically present
in the decision-making forums, but they "lack effective opportunity
to influence the thinking of others." ' One significant way in which
internal exclusion occurs is lack of engagement.1 '
Participatory democratic theory places a lot of confidence in the
ability of elites and the general public to utilize deliberative
decision-making methods. Some research has found that in high
stakes deliberations, participants do not review and reconsider their
preexisting preferences and opinions in light of reasons and
justifications offered by other participants." 2 Participants have
strongly held views at the beginning of the process and they have a
difficult time changing those views.13 Even when participants'
views change, they have a hard time admitting it, because such a
concession can cause them to lose credibility. 4 Additionally, when
RECONCILIATION REPORT, supra note 5, at 54.
108. YOUNG, supra note 1, at 53-54.
109. Id. at 55.
110. Id.
Ill. Id.
112. Carolyn M. Hendricks, John S. Dryzek & Christian Hunold, Thrning Up the Heat:
Partisanship in Deliberative Innovation, 55 POL. STUD. 362, 362 (2007); see also John S.
Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy in Divided Societies: Alternatives to Agonism and Analgesia,
33 POL. THEORY 218, 229 (2005) [hereinafter Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy].
113. See Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy, supra note 112.
114. Id. (noting that "[Uinder 'hot' deliberation, tied to collective decision and involving
partisans, participants have more strongly formed views going into deliberation, and so
cannot easily change"); Gerry Mackie, Does Democratic Deliberation Change Minds? 2-4 (2002)
(paper prepared for American Political Science Association Conference, Boston, Mass.) (on file
with author). Mackie notes that unlike individuals involved in deliberative polls or citizens'
juries, those participating in parliaments and natural groups rarely change their minds. He
attributes this to participants entering deliberative polls or citizens' juries with "undeveloped
views, shaped, if at all, by superficial symbolic attitudes, thus, participants more refine than
change their views in deliberation; participants have no past public position nor future
credibility to defend; participants are not directly responsible for creating or rectifying the
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participants see themselves as members of an identifiable group and
other participants as members of a different identifiable group, they
are more likely to move toward a more extreme position in the
direction of the views they held at the beginning of the process."' 5
Research focused specifically on constitution making in post-conflict
states or transitional democracies, however, has found that more
participatory and inclusive processes broadened the constitutional
agenda and prevented the process from becoming a division of state
resources amongst the powerful players."'
Rwanda's constitution-making process involved high stakes, yet
some challengers successfully obtained internal inclusion while
others did not."7 The experience of gender equity advocates and
multi-party advocates illustrates that participatory constitution-
making systems that facilitate external inclusion without internal
inclusion can generate participation without power. This approach
maintains the negotiated distribution of political power, but it
issue at hand." Id. at 3.
115. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS Do 15, 30 (2001);
see also Amiram Vinokur & Eugene Bernstein, Effects of Partially Shared Persuasive
Arguments on Group-Induced Shifts: A Group Problem-Solving Approach, 29 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 305, 314 (1974). This process is referred to as group polarization.
116. See, e.g., Hart, Constitution-making, supra note 1, at 167 (noting that confrontation
through participatory constitution making can lead to legitimate constitutional settlements);
Samuels, supra note 1, at 670 ("The use of more participatory and inclusive processes does
appear to broaden the constitutional agenda and prevent the process from degenerating into
a mere division of spoils between powerful players."). But see Peter H. Russell, Attempting
Macro Constitutional Change in Australia and Canada. The Politics of Frustration, 7-8 INT'L
J. CANADIAN STUD. 41 (1993). Russell concluded that the process of enacting the Canadian
Charter of Rights clarified old conflicts and created new conflicts: "Canada has the dubious
honour of remaining a nation-state driven to constitutional politics at the mega level by deep
dissensus. This dissensus is as much the effect as the cause of constitutional politics." Id. at
54.
Participatory processes, and particularly those that are deliberative, are not uniform. They
will not always lead to the entrenchment of previously held opinions or promote division, nor
will they always promote greater political inclusion and participation. The context and design
of the participatory process will significantly impact whether or not participation and
deliberation will promote legitimate and effective governance. Archon Fung, Recipes for Public
Spheres: Eight Institutional Design Choices and Their Consequences, 11 J. POL. PHIL. 338, 347-
52 (2003) (examining the consequences of public sphere design choices on the quality of
democratic governance); Samuels, supra note 1, at 670 ("In Afghanistan, for instance, the
participation process was managed in a careful fashion to prevent the warlords or Islamic
extremists from dominating the process. Nonetheless, such divisive impacts are a possibility
if the participatory and consultative process is not carefully designed.").
117. See supra notes 5-11 and accompanying text.
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prevents the state from achieving the full range of normative and
instrumental benefits of participatory constitution making.
Gender equity advocates successfully obtained internal inclusion
in Rwanda's constitution-making process.118 Their efforts led to the
inclusion of constitutional provisions that prohibit gender discrimi-
nation, grant equal protection, accord women equal rights and
duties in marriage and raising children, and most notably reserve
30 percent of the national legislative seats for women." 9 Multi-party
advocates were internally excluded and achieved little substantive
success. The constitution states that a "multi-party system of
government is recognized," it permits the formation of political
organizations, and it allows political organizations to operate
freely. 2 ° Yet other constitutional provisions and the national
regulations governing political parties significantly undermine these
protections. 121
External inclusion was widely available to Rwandan citizens, but
internal inclusion was limited to the political elites and those
within their network.'22 Citizens were able to attend large public
meetings with Legal and Constitutional Commission commissioners,
complete an LCC-issued questionnaire, or submit independent
written comments and proposals. 2 3 There were significantly fewer
opportunities for internal inclusion. The LCC invited feedback and
recommendations from the public, but typically the information
118. U.N. Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women
(OSAG), Expert Group Meeting on Enhancing Women's Participation in Electoral Processes
in Post Conflict Countries, Strengthening Government: The Rule of Women in Rwanda's
Transition: A Summary, U.N. Doc. EGM/ELEC/2004/EP.5 (Jan. 26, 2004) (prepared by
Elizabeth Powley) [hereinafter Strengthening Government].
119. RWANDA CONST. arts. 11 (discrimination), 16 (equal protection), 26 (equal rights and
duties in marriage), 27 (equal rights and duties in child rearing), 76 (reserved seats in
Chamber of Deputies), 82 (reserved seats in Senate).
120. RWANDA CONST. art. 52.
121. Id. Article 52 of the June 2003 constitution prohibits political organizations from
having local level offices. All offices have to be at the national, provincial, or Kigali City levels.
Id. A December 2005 revision now allows political parties to create and maintain local offices.
Id. (amended Aug. 12, 2005). Article 57 states that an organic law will determine the
modalities for creating political organizations and the freedom of speech, association, and the
press are similarly subject to conditions to be determined by law. Id. at arts. 33-35, 57 (2003).
122. See UNITY AND RECONCILIATION REPORT, supra note 5, at 11.
123. See supra notes 5-11 and accompanying text.
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was reviewed and entered into a database.124 The ideas and
opinions that "prevailed over the rest" were retained by the LCC. 26
These ideas and opinions were not deliberated, and sensitive topics
like human rights were not available for public comment.'26
Consequently citizens had to independently create opportunities to
engage the drafters. Gender equity advocates did this by obtaining
an unofficial representative within the LCC.'27 Judith Kanakuze,
one of the civil society representatives, supported the gender equity
advocates' goals. 2 ' As an LCC commissioner, she was able to ensure
that proposals regarding gender equity were seriously reviewed and
considered. 129 She facilitated LCC engagement with gender equity
proposals, which facilitated internal inclusion for the gender equity
advocates.130
The LCC's willingness to engage proposals from the public was
affected by the impact such proposals would have on the distribu-
tion of political power.'"' It was easier for the LCC to engage the
124. UNITY AND RECONCILIATION REPORT, supra note 5, at 53. Neither the LCC's mandate
from the Transitional National Assembly nor its internal rules required the drafting body to
engage the feedback or recommendations.
125. Id. at 54-55.
126. Alfred Mukezamfura, the Deputy Chairman of the LCC, explained that the public
could not be consulted on some topics, such as human rights, because they "cannot suffer
alterations." Id. at 55. He also noted that, "ending the transitional period is not like cutting
a rope; ending the transitional period is a process that will by all means keep up such
valuable things as decentralization and empowerment." Id.
127. See Banks, supra note 2, at 151.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Domestic and international commentators on Rwanda's constitution have noted that
the constitution drafted by the LCC retains the distribution of political power established by
the RPF after its military victory.
The main feature of the draft Constitution is its closeness to the current
institutional set-up of politics in Rwanda. As we all know, this is deeply
beneficial to the perceived interests of the powers-that-be: it all but guarantees
the continued exercise of power by the FPR [Rwandan Patriotic Front]. This
reflects the fact that in Rwanda, power is exclusively in the hands of the FPR,
which faces no solid political, military, or intellectual challenges.
Peter Uvin, Rwanda's Draft Constitution: Some Personal Reflections on Democracy and
Conflict and the Role of the International Community (Feb. 16, 2003), http://www.grandslacs.
net/doc/260 1.pdf; see also UNITY AND RECONCILIATION REPORT, supra note 5, at 21; Peter Uvin,
Wake Up! Some Personal Reflections and Policy Proposals, at 1 (June 2003), http://fletcher.
tufts.edu/faculty/uvin/reports/wakeup.pdf [hereinafter Uvin, Wake Up.] (' Those in power fear
that truly free elections will mean an immediate end to the regime (and victory of any Hutu
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gender equity advocates' proposals, because they did not disrupt
the governance system envisioned by Rwanda's political elites.
Rwanda's gender equity advocates sought equality and non-
discrimination language that has consistently appeared in Rwanda's
constitutions since independence.132 The guaranteed political
participation of women was structured so as not to alter the balance
of power amongst the political parties then participating in the
transitional government. Thirty percent of the seats within the
National Assembly and the Senate are reserved for women.133 The
women who hold these seats are representatives of the women's
structures and they are indirectly elected by the sub-national
women's councils throughout the country."3 Women are also able to
run as members of political parties, but that form of political
participation is not guaranteed. 35 Women were added to the
national legislature, but they were not structurally integrated. This
approach did not introduce uncertainty or ambiguity regarding the
general distribution of political power amongst the political parties
participating in the transitional government.
13 6
Multi-party advocates' critiques of the proposed constitutional
provisions regarding political parties, freedom of expression, and
freedom of association threatened the political elites' sense of
certainty.'37 These advocates sought to ensure that the constitution
would support political competition rather than ratify the RPF's
candidate), which they consider tantamount to suicide."); AMAHORO PEOPLE'S CONGRESS,
supra note 5 ("Clearly, the Rutaremara commission sought to propose a constitution that fits
the current regime, instead of a system that will bring peace and stability to our country.").
132. RWANDA CONST. art. 16 (1991); RWANDA CONST. art. 16 (1978); RWANDA CONST. art.
16 (1962).
133. RWANDA CONST. art. 82.
134. See Strengthening Government, supra note 118, at 10-11.
135. The ability of women to participate in both tracks lead to women making up 48.8
percent of the members of the National Assembly, the highest percentage of women in a
national legislature in the world. Inter-Parliamentary Union, Women in Parliaments: World
Classification (Sept. 30, 2003), http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/arc/classif300903.htm.
136. Requiring 30 percent of the national legislators to be women who are directly elected
and representatives of their geographic locales rather than the women's structures, or
requiring 30 percent of any party's delegation to the national legislature to be women, may
have increased the prominence and power of any of the existing parties or supported the
development of a new competitive party.
137. NAT'L DEMOCRATIC INST., ASSESSMENT OF RWANDA'S PRE-ELECTION POLITICAL
ENVIRONMENT AND THE ROLE OF POLITICAL PARTIES 9 (Aug. 2003), available at http://www.
accessdemocracy.org/Library/1642_rw_assessment092203.pdf.
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monopoly on political power. For example, one critical report raised
concerns about the provisions regarding the Forum on political
parties."i 8 The Forum was seen as intruding in the internal affairs
of political parties and creating a super-party that transformed the
multi-party system provided in article 55 of the constitution into a
one-party state.139 These types of critiques led to individuals and
organizations being labeled as divisionist. 14 °
Multi-party advocates faced challenges not only because of the
substance of their ideas and comments, but also as a result of
Rwanda's history with multi-party politics. Within Rwanda, multi-
party politics was connected with ethnic division.'41 Historically,
political parties had distinct ethnic identities and past elections had
"led to deeply divisive politics and major violence."' 42 Rwandans and
the RPF feared that the emergence of robust political competition
would lead to ethnic-based violence like that experienced during the
1994 genocide.
138. The Forum is a supervisory body for political activity. Between the February 14, 2003
draft of the constitution and the final draft, the Forum was transformed from an optional
organization that political parties could join, to a mandatory consultative forum. Compare
RWANDA CONST. art. 57 (Feb. 14, 2003) with RWANDA CONST. art. 56 (May 26, 2003). Initially
this voluntary organization was charged with "[hiarmonizing the points of view of the
constituent political parties on the country's major political problems." RWANDA CONST. art.
57 (Feb. 14, 2003). After it became a mandatory organization, it became a forum responsible
for "facilitating exchange of ideas by political organizations on major issues facing the
country." RWANDA CONST. art. 56 (May 26, 2003).
139. AMAHORO PEOPLE'S CONGRESS, supra note 5.
140. Divisionism is a serious charge in Rwanda. The Organic Law on Political Parties
states that "[a]ny political organization causing trouble or carrying out divisive acts shall face
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WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
CONCLUSION
Rwanda's participatory constitution-making process served an
educational function more than a deliberative function. The process
did not facilitate engagement between the LCC and the public. The
LCC provided the public with information, but there was little
deliberation by the public of that information, and when the public
did deliberate, the LCC rarely responded. 4 ' The LCC used classic
aggregative techniques to review and evaluate public feedback.
Questionnaire responses were counted and summarized while
written submissions were weighted according to author and
relevance. The LCC attempted to identify the most widely held
opinions regarding the political organization of the Rwandan state.
There was less effort, institutionally or procedurally, to deliberate.
The focus on identifying widely and strongly held opinions created
an opportunity for interest-based political decision making. Yet the
number of interests competing was limited because interests within
the society did not have the same opportunities to organize and
engage in traditional interest group advocacy. This contributed to
the process being externally inclusive, yet internally exclusive for
most Rwandan citizens. Obtaining internal inclusion required the
support of influential domestic allies and a platform that did not
undermine the existing distribution of political power. Such a
process reinforces the existence of a narrow political elite, which
maintains the importance of patronage in countries emerging from
armed conflicts often fought in the name of rectifying political
exclusion.
Participatory constitution making is advocated as a tool for
facilitating the creation of democratic governance systems with
broad citizen involvement and increasing the protection of citizens'
civil and political rights. Post-conflict states that utilize participa-
tory constitution making will often struggle with creating a process
that is internally inclusive. The challenges facing political elites in
143. Public engagement with the government generally took place through written
submissions to the LCC, which were responded to in the form of the Synthesis of Ideas and
drafts of the constitution, but with little public discussion of the content of the submissions
and the reasons for accepting or rejecting the arguments within them.
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post-conflict states are significant and they should not be underesti-
mated. Recognizing the extreme difficulty that such leaders face
should encourage scholars and advocates to acknowledge the risks
political elites in post-conflict states perceive from the use of
participatory constitution making. Such acknowledgment can be the
first step in thinking about strategies for increasing the number of
citizens that are internally included, rather than supporting the use
of institutions and procedures that ultimately reinforce internal
exclusion.
